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ADVANCE DIRECTIVES, DEMENTIA, AND ELIGIBILITY FOR PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH
I. INTRODUCTION?
 In most of the jurisdictions where some form of physician-assisted death (PAD)2 
is legal,3 the requesting individual must be competent to make medical decisions at 
the time of assistance. The requirement of contemporary competence is intended to 
ensure that PAD is limited to people who genuinely want to die and have 
decisionmaking cognitive ability at the time of a final choice with such enormous 
import. Along with terminal illness, defined as the prognosis of death within six 
months, contemporary competence is regarded as an important safeguard against 
mistake and abuse, which are arguably the strongest objections to legalizing PAD.
1. Much of this article’s factual data and moral analysis, and many segments of its specific articulation, are 
contained in the primary and longer paper from which it is derived. See generally Paul T. Menzel & 
Bonnie Steinbock, Advance Directives, Dementia, and Physician-Assisted Death, 41 J.L. Med. & Ethics 
484 (2013). The Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics paper pursues the moral argument at greater length 
through eight paradigm cases of persons with dementia. The current article’s analysis in Parts III–VI is 
considerably shorter, and it focuses more on all three of the basic eligibility conditions for legal physician-
assisted death, not only current competency. Part VII of this article is entirely new. The background 
research that enabled me to construct this article was supported by a month as Visiting Researcher at the 
Brocher Foundation, Hermance, Switzerland, in April 2012. I am greatly indebted to my co-author of 
the primary article that resulted from that research, Bonnie Steinbock. While at Brocher, we benefited 
greatly from consultation with Dr. Samia Hurst of the Institute of Biomedical Ethics, University of 
Geneva Medical School. I also received helpful feedback at the Freedom of Choice at the End of Life: 
Patients’ Rights in a Shifting Legal and Political Landscape symposium at New York Law School on 
November 16, 2012, especially in conversation with Professor Peter J. Strauss, the symposium chair.
2. The term “physician-assisted death” covers both physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. In physician-
assisted suicide, the patient takes lethal drugs made available through a physician’s prescription; in 
euthanasia, the physician delivers the lethal drugs, usually by injection. The term “physician-assisted 
suicide” has fallen out of favor among many proponents, who wish to distinguish it from suicide in 
general and therefore prefer “aid in dying.”
3. Namely, in Vermont, Oregon, Washington, and Montana in the United States, and in Belgium and 
Switzerland. Aid in dying is legal by statute in Vermont, Oregon, and Washington. See Patient Choice and 
Control at End of Life Act, ch. 113, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5291 (West 2013); Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800–897 (West 2013); Washington Death with Dignity Act, 
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.245.010–904 (West 2013). It is legal by a decision of the state supreme court in 
Montana. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009). In June 2012, it became conditionally legal by 
court decision in British Columbia, though that decision was subsequently overturned by the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal in October 2013. Carter v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 2012 BCSC 886 (Can. B.C.), 
available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/SC/12/08/2012BCSC0886cor1.htm, rev’d, 2013 BCCA 
435 (Can. B.C. Ct. App.), available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/CA/13/04/2013BCCA0435.
htm. In Belgium, the patient must be legally competent and conscious at the moment of making the 
request for euthanasia. See The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 28, 2002, 9 Ethical Perspectives 
182 (2002), available at http://www.ethical-perspectives.be/viewpic.php?LAN=E&TABLE=EP&ID=59 
(unofficial translation by Dale Kidd & Herman Nys), although legislation was introduced in 2013 that 
would expand euthanasia to minors and those suffering from dementia. See Connor Adams Sheets, Belgian 
Parliament Posed to Approve Child Euthanasia Law, Int’l Bus. Times (June 11, 2013, 3:03 PM), http://
www.ibtimes.com/belgian-parliament-posed-approve-child-euthanasia-law-1301825. In Switzerland, 
both physician-assisted suicide and assisted suicide more generally are legal by statute, and though 
voluntary self-administration is required, it is not restricted to terminal illness. See Samia A. Hurst & Alex 
Mauron, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Switzerland: Allowing a Role for Non-Physicians, 326 BMJ 271, 
271–73 (2003), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1125125/.
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 In the Netherlands and Belgium, where euthanasia is legal, terminal illness is not 
required. In the Netherlands, neither is contemporary competence; the focus is 
instead on voluntariness, a requirement that can in some cases be satisfied by the 
patient’s previous decisions and directives. In both countries, unbearable suffering is 
also required.4
 These various qualifying conditions for PAD—contemporary competence, 
terminal illness, and unbearable suffering—preclude its use for patients with chronic 
severe dementia. Although patients in the early stages of dementia may still be 
competent, they lose the ability to make medical decisions for themselves as dementia 
progresses. Nor are most patients in even severe dementia considered terminally ill; 
chronic progressive dementia is typically not seen as terminal illness until its very 
final stages, and, even then, prognoses of six months or less to live due to end-stage 
dementia are treacherous. Nor is unbearable suffering a common characteristic of 
people with severe dementia, yet many are as opposed—or even more strongly 
opposed—to having their lives end in years of severe dementia as they are to enduring 
a few months of suffering at the end of life. If they have a right to choose death to 
avoid the latter, why do they not have a right to avoid the former?
 Dementia thus poses a strong challenge to the current legal limits on PAD. 
Access to PAD for persons with dementia, not just for those who are currently 
competent, terminally ill, or unbearably suffering, will become an increasingly 
pressing issue as the world’s population ages. By 2040, the number of those over age 
eighty-five will nearly quadruple from what it was in 2000.5 Almost half of people 
over eighty-five have some form of dementia.6 About 5.2 million Americans have 
Alzheimer’s disease, the most common form.7 These numbers will rise progressively 
over the next several decades.
 This article will make the case that through clear, informed, and persistent 
advance directives, people should be allowed to direct their future death in the event 
of severe dementia. Neither current competency, terminal illness, nor unbearable 
suffering should be retained as strict qualifying conditions for legalized PAD. Other 
limitations can preserve its voluntariness, prevent its abuse, and respect the value of 
patients’ lives.
4. For Dutch law, see Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 
(2002), available at http://www.eutanasia.ws/documentos/Leyes/Internacional/Holanda Ley 2002.pdf. 
The procedures codified in the 2002 law ref lect Dutch medical practice since 1973, when doctors began 
openly providing euthanasia on request. Two doctors must certify that the patient’s desire to die stems 
from “hopeless and unbearable suffering.” Under the Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 28, 2002, supra 
note 3, two physicians must certify that the person endures constant and unbearable physical or 
psychological pain from incurable illness or accident; a third medical opinion to the same effect must be 
obtained if the person is not terminally ill.
5. The U.S. Population Is Aging, Urban Inst., http://www.urban.org/retirement_policy/agingpopulation.
cfm (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
6. Dementia: Hope Through Research, Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders & Stroke, http://www.
ninds.nih.gov/disorders/dementias/detail_dementia.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2013).
7. Alzheimer’s Facts and Figures, Alzheimer’s Ass’n, http://www.alz.org/alzheimers_disease_facts_and_
figures.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
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 Those limitations include the three conditions on advance directives already 
indicated—they must be clear, informed, and persistent. To be clear, a directive for 
implementation in later dementia must not refer to just “dementia” without further 
specification; it must convey what stage of severity of dementia the person wants to 
trigger application of the directive, including specific conditions that one may regard 
as relevant (for example, an inability to recognize close friends and loved ones). The 
directive must be informed about the primary condition, dementia, to which it speaks; 
it should recognize, for example, that persons with dementia have great emotional 
variance—they can be distressed, or angry, or relatively content and happy. Directives 
are also more authoritative when they are persistent—when they have been reiterated 
in the early stages of dementia (for example, when a person becomes more familiar 
with the condition but can still understand her directive).
 Throughout the last two decades in the Netherlands, and just recently in 
Belgium, the prospect of using PAD for patients with dementia has sparked a great 
deal of discussion.8 In 2011, an important Dutch case raised precisely the question of 
whether the voluntariness requirement demands contemporaneous competence.9 
The Dutch concluded that it did not.10 For PAD as well as the refusal of life-
supporting treatment, they concluded that voluntariness can be satisfied by clear and 
reiterated advance directives.11
 In a jurisdiction—such as the Netherlands—where euthanasia is permitted, 
patient directives for later use of PAD naturally warrant the term “advance euthanasia 
directives” (AEDs). Where euthanasia is illegal, however, it will be difficult to refer 
to such directives as advance euthanasia directives. Nonetheless, even where aid in 
dying, but not euthanasia, is permitted, competent individuals could still be allowed 
to write advance directives for aid in dying in the event of a mentally debilitating 
condition such as severe dementia. In those jurisdictions, such directives would 
technically be “advance directives for aid in dying” (ADAID). Instead of using this 
awkward neologism, I will use the shorter term “AED” for this situation as well and 
make the case for AEDs in that broader context.
 While AEDs for dementia can be morally justified and acted on in their primary 
intended circumstances, I will also argue that the issue of when they should actually be 
followed is exceedingly complex and multifaceted. One complexity has to do with the 
range of cognitive abilities and quality of life in dementia. Another has to do with the 
fact that the demented person may change her mind about preferring death to living 
with dementia, in which case we should not hold the person to her AED. In still other 
cases, even where there has been no change of mind and the directive is clear and 
8. See Cees M.P.M. Hertogh et al., Would We Rather Lose Our Life than Lose Our Self? Lessons from the 
Dutch Debate on Euthanasia for Patients with Dementia, 7 Am. J. Bioethics 48, 48–56 (2007). For recent 
developments in Belgium, see Sheets, supra note 3. 
9. See Michael Cook, Informed Consent in Netherlands: Euthanasia, BioEdge (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.
bioedge.org/index.php/bioethics/bioethics_article/9826.
10. See id.
11. See infra Part II for a discussion of both this case and Dutch law on PAD.
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informed, due consideration of both the demented person’s best interests and relevant 
societal considerations can point toward not implementing it. Thus, whether the use of 
AEDs should be permitted to avoid prolonged life in dementia does not have a simple 
yes-or-no answer. It depends on important differentiating details.
 Part II brief ly reviews the main arguments in favor of PAD, noting that they 
apply not only to terminal illness, but also to avoiding prolonged life in dementia. It 
also describes the developing situation in the Netherlands, including the 2011 case 
mentioned above. Part III lays out some basic information about dementia and relates 
that to the requisite clarity and voluntariness of actionable AEDs and the issue of 
later changes of mind. Part IV takes up the most fundamental challenge for advance 
directives that is posed by the difference between the competent pre-dementia self 
(the “then-self ”) and the current self in dementia (the “now-self ”); the prominent 
views of Rebecca Dresser, John Robertson, Ronald Dworkin, and Agnieszka 
Jaworska are considered.
 I delineate my own view in Parts V, VI, and VII. Part V explains how the value 
of life varies greatly in dementia and why that makes a patient’s advance into severe 
dementia critical to the authority of an AED. Part VI pulls the most important 
moral considerations into the notion of a “sliding scale,” where the case for 
implementing an AED gains as the person’s capacity to generate new values and to 
enjoy life decreases. In Part VII, I argue that—despite the fact that severe dementia 
can rarely be deemed a “terminal illness” in the sense of death being likely within six 
months—it is a terminal illness in other highly relevant respects. In Part VIII, I 
review the previous moral analysis and articulate a conceptual path for moving from 
legalized aid in dying to actionable AEDs for severe dementia.
II. BASIC MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH AND DUTCH LAW
 The two basic moral arguments in favor of PAD focus on suffering and on 
autonomy. The former maintains that it is cruel to force a terminally ill patient to 
continue to suffer terrible pain at the end of life when such pain cannot be eradicated 
or adequately controlled and has no purpose (such as restoring the patient to health). 
Clearly the argument based on suffering is not limited to competent individuals; a 
person in dementia may suffer as much as someone with greater cognitive capacity.
 The argument based on autonomy focuses on the right of people to make crucial 
decisions about how their lives will go for themselves, without interference from the 
state.12 Many have argued that the same value of autonomy that underlies the right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment is also implicated in a right to choose death.13 They 
regard as irrational a situation where the law allows people to die certain and expedited 
12. The right to refuse medical treatment, including life-sustaining medical treatment, is well established in 
the United States by common law and landmark court decisions, including Quinlan, Cruzan, and 
Bouvia. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 659–60, 663–64 (N.J. 1976) (reasoning that an individual’s 
right to discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment overcomes state interests); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 263 (1990); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1134 
(1986) (holding that a patient has a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment). 
13. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 10, 10–22 (1992).
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deaths by refusing to eat and drink,14 or by refusing life-supportive treatment, but 
does not allow them to have their doctors provide them with a quick and painless 
death.15 It would seem to be similarly irrational to allow people to use advance 
directives to expedite death by refusing life-supportive treatment, but not by PAD.
 The arguments based on suffering and autonomy are not inherently limited to 
terminal illness. Suffering can be as great, if not greater, when it extends through the 
much longer time of chronic, non-terminal illness, and people can have strong, fully 
voluntary, and informed convictions that death would best come sooner rather than 
later even if they are not terminally ill.
 In this article, I will assume that these basic arguments for aid in dying are 
ultimately convincing and put to one side the general debate about its fundamental 
moral and legal legitimacy.16 The focus, instead, will be on the question of whether—
by dropping the requirements of contemporaneous competence, prognosis of death 
within six months, and unbearable suffering—PAD can be justifiably expanded to 
allow for its application to situations of severe dementia.
 In the Netherlands, PAD has recently been expanded in respect to terminal 
illness and contemporaneous competence. For two decades, the Dutch have had a 
vigorous debate about the eligibility for euthanasia of patients with severe dementia.17 
Traditionally, Dutch doctors have interpreted the requirement that euthanasia be a 
voluntary and carefully considered decision of patients to rule out persons with 
dementia. In March 2011, however, a Dutch woman in severe dementia received 
euthanasia.18 The woman was not named, but I will refer to her as “Lotte.” She was 
sixty-four years old and a long-time supporter of the Dutch euthanasia law. When 
fully competent, she had written an advance directive in which she expressed her 
desire to die rather than go into a nursing home. Lotte repeated this desire over time 
to her family physician, and she was supported in her request by husband and 
children. As dementia grew more severe, she could remember only bits of her 
directive. Nevertheless, in every conversation with her doctor, she said that she would 
rather die than go into a nursing home. She also appeared to be suffering; she was 
frequently angry, confused, and cried often. Ultimately, her doctors judged that both 
14. For an extensive defense of this path to death, see generally Stanley A. Terman et al., The Best 
Way to Say Goodbye: A Legal Peaceful Choice at the End of Life (2007). For an extensive 
treatment of the legal status of voluntarily stopping eating and drinking (VSED), see generally 
Thaddeus Mason Pope & Lindsey E. Anderson, Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking: A Legal 
Treatment Option at the End of Life, 17 Widener L. Rev. 363 (2011).
15. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia and 
Individual Freedom 184 (1993); Brock, supra note 13, at 19.
16. For an opposing view, see Herbert Hendin & Kathleen Foley, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A 
Medical Perspective, 24 Issues L. & Med. 121, 121 (2008).
17. See Hertogh et al., supra note 8, at 48; Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot Bevordering 
der Geneeskunst (KNMG Royal Dutch Med. Ass’n), The Role of the Physician in the 
Voluntary Termination of Life (2011) [hereinafter Dutch Position Paper], available at http://
knmg.artsennet.nl/Publicaties/KNMGpublicatie/Position-paper-The-role-of-the-physician-in-the-
voluntary-termination-of-life-2011.htm.
18. See Cook, supra note 9.
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of the essential legal requirements—voluntariness and unbearable suffering—were 
met. All five relevant review committees concluded the same.19
 The significance of the decision for Lotte was magnified by the fact that shortly 
thereafter, in June 2011, the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) issued a 
major position paper including new guidelines for interpreting the Dutch euthanasia 
law.20 An obvious concern about the expansion of euthanasia to patients in dementia 
or with chronic psychiatric illness is abuse. The KNMG called such cases especially 
difficult: “Any assessment of the considerations prompting such a request and of 
whether the suffering is indeed unbearable and lasting is generally much more 
complicated in this category of patients . . . . [P]hysicians [need to] act with extreme 
caution and restraint . . . .”21
 Voluntariness is also critically important in the Dutch euthanasia law. Under the 
new guidelines of the KNMG, the voluntariness requirement can be satisfied by 
evidence that euthanasia is what the patient wanted, even if the patient is now no 
longer competent.22 Carefully considered advance directives are one of the best kinds 
of evidence, especially if they are reiterated over time,23 including in early dementia 
when one presumably has a clearer idea of what life in dementia means, and they 
speak clearly to the patient’s current dementia situation.
 Lotte’s case and the Dutch guidelines that emerged shortly thereafter have set 
the stage for a mature discussion of legally actionable AEDs. The directives that 
Dutch law considers viable, and on which the discussion of this article will focus, are 
not just any AEDs. They are directives that clearly speak to dementia, and that have 
been carefully considered and persistently reiterated by their authors. This article 
will focus on whether and when directives of this specific sort should be implemented.
III. VOLUNTARINESS: UNDERSTANDING DEMENTIA
 To be truly voluntary in the morally relevant sense, a directive needs to be well 
informed. If it harbors misinformation about dementia, it carries less moral force, 
and perhaps much less. To expand the legalization of PAD to advance directives for 
dementia, therefore, the directives need to emerge from a reasonably accurate 
understanding of dementia—its varying stages and qualitative types, the risk of 
prejudicially stereotyping it, and the potential for adaptation and changes of mind.
 Dementia refers to a wide range of cognitive impairments and memory loss severe 
enough to interfere with the normal functions of daily life. The range from mild to 
severe or advanced dementia is conveyed in the array of deficits used in clinical 
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Dutch Position Paper, supra note 17, at 7.
22. See id. at 12.
23. This moral condition was foreshadowed by Leslie P. Francis in 1993. See generally Leslie P. Francis, 
Advance Directives for Voluntary Euthanasia: A Volatile Combination?, 18 J. Med. & Phil. 3, 297–322 
(1993).
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assessment tests, such as the Functional Assessment Staging Test.24 According to this 
test, the deficits in “mild” dementia affect daily functions such as bill paying, cooking, 
house cleaning, and traveling. A person in “moderate” dementia requires help in 
slightly more basic daily activities, such as selecting one’s clothes. In “moderately 
severe” dementia, the person has difficulty putting on clothes, bathing, and toileting 
(with urinary or fecal incontinence). In “severe” dementia, one is unable to speak daily 
more than five to six words in all, or more than two words clearly, and one lacks either 
the ability to walk, to sit up, to hold up one’s head, or to smile. Inability to recognize 
even the closest friends and relatives often accompanies severe dementia.
 Some scales define a more advanced “very severe” stage, in which “all verbal 
abilities are lost . . . . These patients . . . require assistance in toileting and in eating. 
They . . . lose psychomotor skills [as though the brain is] no longer . . . able to tell the 
body what to do.”25 It will become clear in my later analysis (Parts V–VII, especially) 
that the features of severe and very severe dementia are highly relevant to the 
authority that an AED holds for its implementation. I will refer to the achievement 
of this morally relevant stage as “severe” or “advanced” dementia, without attending 
to any more refined differences between “severe” and “very severe” dementia.
 The extent to which the impairments of dementia interfere with subjective 
quality of life varies. When the cognitive level of mental life has changed, the effect 
on affective temperament can range from positive to highly negative. Some with 
dementia are continually frightened or at moments extremely scared, or anxious and 
irritable, perhaps even violent. Others are evidently happy, sometimes eagerly 
participating in the activities of which they are still capable. Only rarely, however, do 
such fortuitous characteristics obtain in severe or advanced dementia.
 Judgments about the degree of personality change with dementia are complicated 
by the fact that, most of the time, capacities lost may briefly re-emerge in moments 
of temporary lucidity. At such times, it may be possible to determine whether the 
individual still holds the beliefs or values previously expressed in an advance directive 
or in actions throughout their lives. The patient may show flashes of “her old self,” 
even into fairly severe dementia.
 The variety and unpredictability within dementia—even within a given 
diagnostic type such as Alzheimer’s—must be taken into account for a directive to be 
reasonably well informed. No one can know in advance whether she will be among 
the “happy demented” or the terribly frightened and anxious. Nonetheless, advance 
directives can make helpful reference to clinically defined stages such as “severe” or 
“advanced,” and to specific manifestations such as the inability to recognize close 
24. See, e.g., Med. Care Corp., Functional Assessment Staging Test, available at http://www.
mciscreen.com/pdf/fast_overview.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
25. This corresponds to Stage Seven of the longstanding Global Deterioration Scale used since 1982. See 
Barry Reisberg et al., The Global Deterioration Scale for Assessment of Primary Degenerative Disease, 139 
Am. J. Psychiatry 1136, 1138 (1982). Other authors label this stage “advanced,” adding the clarification 
of the inability to recognize familiar faces or to walk, as well as the incontinence of urine and stool. See 
Susan L. Mitchell et al., Advanced Dementia: State of the Art and Priorities for the Next Decade, 156 
Annals Internal Med. 45, 47 (2012). Sometimes the “advanced” or “very severe” stage is referred to 
as “end-stage” dementia.
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friends and relatives that the author of the directive regards as especially relevant to 
her concerns. The directives that create the strongest case for their implementation 
will be those that indicate an understanding that dementia comes in a variety of 
stages and affective characters.
 Difficulties in writing an informed AED for application in dementia stem not 
only from unpredictable variation in dementia’s stages and effects. A further related 
problem is that people often think prospectively that they would find a particular 
disabling condition unbearable or worse than death, only to find that, when they 
actually experience the condition, it is not nearly as bad as they thought it would be. 
 Sometimes such misjudgment is due to a failure of imagination about future life. 
People focus only on the abilities and pleasurable experiences they will lose, without 
recognizing potentially positive aspects to living in an “eternal present” with severe 
memory loss.26 Another relevant factor is later adaptation.27 While people experience 
a drop in subjective well-being upon becoming disabled, they often regain the level 
of happiness they had previously. An AED written in ignorance of this potential for 
adaptation has less moral force.
 One of the ways in which the reality of adaptation can be revealed is later changes 
of mind about the value of life in dementia. All parties—authors of the directives, 
later caregivers, and loved ones—should be sensitive to this possibility. Increasing 
forgetfulness and failure to recognize most friends, for example, may sometimes not 
be experienced as nearly as destructive of quality of life as people thought it would 
be. In early and moderate stages of dementia, therefore, people may actually change 
their minds about what they said in their directive. In two ways, at least, this fact 
should be accommodated. First, explicitly in a directive, an author can express 
awareness of such possible changes of mind, and second, third parties later should 
watch for changes of mind, an issue I will return to in Part V.
 Attitudes toward disability, including dementia, can also stem from societal 
prejudice. Some of what people recoil from in the prospect of severe dementia—the 
incontinence, drooling, loss of mobility, and extreme dependence, for example—may 
spring from unenlightened attitudes.28 Persuasive advance directives for dementia 
will not evidence such attitudes, and perhaps they should even expressly acknowledge 
their danger.
26. See, e.g., Robert Leleux, The Living End: A Memoir of Forgetting and Forgiving 101 (2012). 
As his grandmother—who was estranged from her daughter—lost memory and sense of time, grudges 
and old hurt feelings disappeared. She forgot what had made her angry. Id.
27. This is strongly confirmed in the psychological literature. See Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, 
Hedonic Adaptation in Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 302–29 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., Russell Sage Found. 1999); Paul T. Menzel et al., The Role of Adaptation to Disability 
and Disease in Health State Valuation: A Preliminary Analysis, 55 Soc. Sci. & Med. 2149, 2149–58 (2002); 
David Arnold et al., Comparison of Direct and Indirect Methods of Estimating Health State Utilities for Resource 
Allocation: Review and Empirical Analysis, 339 BMJ 385 (2009), available at http://www.bmj.com/
content/339/bmj.b2688.pdf%2Bhtml.
28. See Adrienne Asch, Recognizing Death While Affirming Life: Can End of Life Reform Uphold a Disabled 
Person’s Interest in Continued Life?, 35:6 Hastings Ctr. Rep. S31 (2005).
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 Some people, too, may view living in dementia as a fate worse than death because 
of lamentable, sub-standard conditions that can characterize nursing homes. It goes 
without saying that such conditions are unacceptable and that steps to improve the 
lives of people with dementia need to be taken. Certainly, however, not all nursing 
home care is deficient.
 All of these factors—failure to understand dementia, prejudice, lack of 
imagination, failure to appreciate adaptation, fear of poor nursing home care—can 
diminish a directive’s moral weight. The desire to die to avoid years in severe 
dementia, however, does not have to reflect such biasing factors. As will be argued 
later in Part V, that desire can be based on strong and legitimate convictions about 
the meaning and narrative of one’s life. Dementia has profound effects on selfhood, 
making it arguably different from other disabling conditions.
 This point is illustrated, ironically, by the way that a strong critic of prejudice 
against disabled persons, Adrienne Asch, explains how many people with profound 
disabilities can be helped to live full, meaningful lives. With assistance, they can
hold jobs, engage in volunteer activities, visit friends . . . and generally 
participate in ordinary family, civic, and social life. Wheelchairs do not 
confine; they liberate . . . . Using the services and skills of a personal assistant 
who helps them . . . is no more shameful or embarrassing than it is for a 
nondisabled person . . . to value the expertise of a mechanic . . . .29
Note how little of this applies to people in severe dementia. They do not hold jobs, 
engage in volunteer activities, or socialize with family and friends. Moreover, the 
interest in determining how one’s life should go, including how it would best end, is 
an interest shared equally by the “temporarily abled” and disabled alike.
 A strong directive for PAD in dementia should manifest an awareness of 
dementia’s varying stages, its variable effects, prejudicial attitudes toward it, and the 
potential to adapt to it.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE: THE “NOW-SELF” AND THE “THEN-SELF”
 The most serious and difficult challenge to the authority of advance directives is 
that the very condition that gives rise to them—the inability to participate in medical 
decisionmaking—can dramatically change one’s interests. Rebecca Dresser and John 
Robertson make this criticism of the so-called “orthodox approach” of American 
courts.30 The logic of that approach begins with the right of competent patients to 
refuse medical treatment even when it is necessary to preserve their lives. And then, 
since people do not lose their rights simply because they happen to become 
29. Id. at S32–S33.
30. Rebecca Dresser & John S. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent 
Patients, 17 J.L. Med. & Ethics 234, 234–40 (1989). For an insightful and comprehensive treatment of 
this challenge, which also relates to Dresser’s numerous other writings, see L.W. Sumner, Assisted 
Death: A Study in Ethics and Law 103–17 (2011). Sumner also gives a detailed treatment of 
Dworkin’s position, including the Margo case that features centrally in Dworkin’s discussion. See id. at 
108–17.
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incompetent, respect for patients who are incompetent requires according them the 
same right to refuse treatment. Refusal should be based on the patient’s own wishes, 
either as conveyed in an advance directive or as determined by the patient’s appropriate 
proxy. Such “substituted judgment” respects a person’s autonomy and rights in her 
current incompetence.
 For Dresser and Robertson, this approach is based on a fiction. The now-
incompetent person is not an autonomous chooser; that person—the autonomously 
choosing person—is no longer present. The incompetent individual now before us 
may have quite different interests than the previously competent person who wrote 
the directive. She may, for example, no longer have the same interest in preserving 
control or in not being dependent on caregivers.31
 This critique rests in part on epistemic considerations: “It is difficult, if not 
impossible, for competent individuals to predict their interests in future treatment 
situations when they are incompetent . . . .”32 Philosophical theories of identity that 
emphasize psychological continuity provide added support. Derek Parfit, for example, 
has suggested that a person’s life can consist in a series of successive selves, with a 
new self emerging as the individual undergoes significant changes in beliefs, desires, 
memories, and intentions.33 If the successive selves are not identical, the authority of 
the prior self over the later self becomes questionable. David DeGrazia perspicuously 
labels this the “someone else” problem.34
 The phenomenon of a very different self is well illustrated by the case of Margo, 
brought to prominence in the literature by Dworkin.35 Andrew Firlik, a medical 
student, repeatedly visits Margo, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease. With each 
arrival, Margo behaves as if she knows him, though without ever using his name. She 
says she reads mysteries, but Firlik notices that “her place in the book jumps randomly 
from day to day . . . . [S]he feels good just sitting and humming to herself . . . nodding 
off liberally, occasionally turning to a fresh page.”36 She takes abundant pleasure in 
simple acts, such as eating peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwiches.37 Firlik writes that 
“despite her illness, or maybe somehow because of it, Margo is undeniably one of the 
happiest people I have ever known.”38 Undoubtedly, Margo’s past life and concerns 
were different than the concerns and life she has now. Does such difference, 
considerable as it is, now make her a different person?
31. See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 30, at 236. 
32. Id.
33. See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 199–379 (1985).
34. See David DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics 159–202 (2005); David DeGrazia, Advance 
Directives, Dementia, and ‘the Someone Else Problem’, 13 Bioethics 373 (1999).
35. See Dworkin, supra note 15, at 220–32. 
36. Andrew D. Firlik, Margo’s Logo, 265 JAMA 201, 201 (1991).
37. See id.
38. Id.
332
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES, DEMENTIA, AND ELIGIBILITY FOR PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH
 It does not. The driving desire behind the very notion of an advance directive is 
that people want control over their later lives; the unspoken assumption is that the 
incompetent individual is numerically the same person as the prior competent one. 
Departing from this common assumption would create all kinds of difficulties, 
especially in the law.39 Bodily identity has huge pragmatic advantages as a criterion 
of same-individual identity compared to any psychological continuity standard, with 
its much greater difficulties for line-drawing and inter-subjective discernment.40 
Interpersonally, people just do, in fact, use bodily identity, such as when they uphold 
contracts, blame people or praise them, or discern criminal and civil liability. People 
also, of course, speak of “becoming a different person,” but their usual reference in 
such cases is to personality changes, not to a going-out-of-existence of one person and 
a coming-in of another. In any remotely realistic framework for discussing the 
authority of advance directives, therefore, we should presume that a patient like 
Margo is numerically the same person as she was before her change in dementia.
 That said, however, even with Margo regarded as still Margo, a “then-self ”/“now-
self ” problem still remains: Although Margo’s identity has not changed, have her 
interests changed so much that her earlier directive should not be followed?
 A. Dworkin’s View: The Dominance of Critical Interests
 In confronting this question, Dworkin maintains that the radical change in some 
of a person’s interests in dementia does not undercut the moral authority of advance 
directives, including AEDs.41 His argument comes in two key steps. First, the choice 
that the competent “then-self ” expressed in a directive does not just manifest 
autonomy; it also defines the person’s continuing “critical interests.”42 Second, such 
interests dominate mere “experiential interests” in determining what is in the overall 
best interests of the person with dementia.43
 Because infants and young children lack the mental capacity to weigh different 
(and often conflicting) factors and to make their own decisions, it does not make 
sense to ascribe to them a right of autonomy. It is also absurd to invoke respect for 
autonomy in the case of never-competent adults who have been severely impaired 
from birth. In both cases, decisions should be made for them on the basis of their 
best interests.
 The situation is different for incompetent adults who were previously competent. 
The beliefs, desires, and values they have while autonomous choosers form what 
Dworkin calls “critical interests.” These are second-order interests, involving a 
39. See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 30, at 236, 239–40. 
40. See Howard Klepper & Mary Rorty, Personal Identity, Advance Directives, and Genetic Testing for 
Alzheimer Disease, 3 Genetic Testing 99 (1999); Nancy Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68 
N.C. L. Rev. 845, 845–65 (1990).
41. See Dworkin, supra note 15, at 209–13.
42. Id. The use of the “now-self ”/“then-self ” terminology originates with this author, not with Dworkin.
43. Id. at 234.
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certain level of thought and ref lection about one’s interests.44 They include, for 
example, convictions about “what helps to make a life good on the whole.”45
 Such convictions have, as their object of valuation, states of affairs that can obtain 
when people are no longer competent or even alive. While experiential interests 
continue to exist only as long as someone is experiencing them, critical interests are 
not so confined. They exist, to be satisfied or not, even after one no longer experiences 
them. Thus, while the dead and those in a persistent vegetative state no longer have 
experiential interests, they continue to have critical interests. If someone cares about 
what happens to his property, his family, or his reputation after he dies, he has a 
critical interest in these things. To dispose of property contrary to his will, to violate 
the provisions of his advance directive, or to unfairly tarnish his reputation after his 
death are all ways of still harming him.46 That we make such judgments is evidence 
that people have non-experiential, critical interests.
 While dead and permanently unconscious individuals can have only critical 
interests, people with dementia have both types of interests—experiential and 
critical—and these may conf lict.47 Suppose that Margo wrote a strong directive 
stipulating PAD in any level of dementia as bad as or worse than what she now has, 
but that she now experiences her days as a largely happy, and at times even an 
energetic, person. According to Dworkin, respect for autonomy requires us to respect 
the directive because it represents “a judgment about the overall shape of the kind of 
life he [or she] wants to have led.”48 To ignore it, and sacrifice a person’s critical 
interests to satisfy experiential interests, would violate autonomy.49
 Dworkin’s further claim is that doing so would not only be a violation of 
autonomy, but would also misconstrue what is in Margo’s best interests.50 This is 
because, for Dworkin, what is ultimately best for Margo is not determined by her 
experiential interests but by her critical interests.
44. The distinction between second-order and first-order applies to both desires and interests. One simply 
has first-order desires—reflection about another desire is not involved. Second-order desires are desires 
about one’s first-order desires. Just as first-order interests form in relation to one’s first-order desires (the 
interests that one has in one’s first-order desires being satisfied), similarly, second-order interests form 
in relation to one’s second-order desires (the interests that one has in one’s second-order desires being 
satisfied). An alternative way of explaining second-order interests is that they form when one has desires 
about one’s first-order interests. Both second-order desires and second-order interests involve a degree—
and a kind—of ref lection not required of first-order desires and interests.
45. Dworkin, supra note 15, at 201–02.
46. An extensive treatment of this matter is found in Raymond Angelo Belliotti, Posthumous Harm: 
Why the Dead Are Still Vulnerable (2012).
47. See Dworkin, supra note 15, at 192.
48. Id. at 226.
49. “Making someone die in a way that others approve, but he believes a horrifying contradiction of his life, 
is a devastating, odious form of tyranny.” Id. at 217.
50. See id.
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 If I decide, when I am competent, that it would be best for me not to 
remain alive in a seriously and permanently demented state, then a fiduciary 
could contradict me only by exercising an unacceptable form of moral 
paternalism . . . . Once we rule out that form of paternalism—once we accept 
that we must judge Margo’s critical interests as she did when competent to do 
so—then the conflict between autonomy and beneficence seems to disappear.51
 Critical interests reflect a person’s integrity and reflective, second-order desires. 
They outweigh—they trump—experiential interests in construing what is in a 
person’s best interests because they are reinforced at the second-order level. They are 
interests about what ultimately matters to people and, thus, are their most important 
interests. For Dworkin, then, Margo’s best interests—as well as her autonomy—
support following her advance directive.
 B. Jaworska’s Critique: New Critical Interests 
 Jaworska, perhaps Dworkin’s most well-known critic on advance directives for 
dementia, grants him his claim about the dominant weight of critical interests.52 
Where Jaworska differs from Dworkin is in seeing persons with dementia as still 
capable of generating new critical interests, including ones about the value of life.53
 Jaworska appeals to the distinction between values and desires. Desiring is the 
more basic, first-order notion. By contrast, valuing involves ref lection. We do not 
always value what we desire—we try to break habits, for example. To value something 
is not merely to want it, but to think that it is good—that is a kind of second-order 
appraisal. For Dworkin, to form critical interests one must be capable of having 
convictions about what makes life—one’s own life—good as a whole. This cannot be 
said for Jaworska, for whom critical interests can issue from simpler second-order 
desires. “[C]onvictions about what is good to have . . . do not require the ability to 
grasp or review one’s whole life.”54
 Jaworska provides the example of Mrs. D., who was diagnosed with probable 
Alzheimer’s disease, and is now moderately to severely impaired. Mrs. D. volunteers 
for medical research and explains her decision: “I could have said, ‘no,’ but believe me, 
51. Id.
52. See Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value, 
28 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 105, 112 (1999).
In the case of an ordinary competent person, when his critical interests (his judgments 
and values) come into conflict with his experiential interests (what would lead to the 
optimal state of mind for him), we do not hesitate to give precedence to his well-
considered values and judgments, and we concede that this is, overall, best for him. . . . 
The case of our demented person turns out to be no different: in his conflict between 
ongoing experiential and critical interests, it is also best to privilege the latter.
 Id.
53. See id. at 112–14.
54. Id. at 113.
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if I can help me and my [fellow] man, I would do it.”55 This suggests that Mrs. D. had 
considered her decision and thought it would be wrong to refuse, which is a clear 
second-order activity. Mrs. D. does not have mere desires and experiential interests; 
she has values. She can form new critical interests.56
 Jaworska believes that what often happens to persons in dementia is that they 
change some of their values. They “are naturally inclined to . . . appreciate . . . simpler 
pleasures. Thus, after developing Alzheimer’s, even former highbrow intellectuals 
come to value, or value more highly, the pleasures of listening to music, gardening, 
yoga, simple art-making, telling fanciful stories to their grandchildren . . . .”57
 For Jaworska, such changes are crucial to assessing the validity of an advance 
directive. It is one thing for someone to write an advance directive directing their 
treatment in case of permanent unconsciousness; the directive has full authority 
because later there is no currently active agent. It is quite different with an advance 
directive for dementia, when there will still be a valuer. “The person executing an 
advance directive for dementia is more akin to someone who anticipates that his 
values will change for the worse in the future and attempts to hold his future self to 
his current values by making others promise that they will, at a future time, enforce 
his current values against his will.”58 What, Jaworska asks, would justify privileging 
the earlier values? Few of us, for example would want to be held to the values we 
espoused in our teens or twenties. Then why should the demented person be held to 
values she no longer holds?
 C. Taking Stock of the Dworkin-Jaworska Argument
 Jaworska may seem to have the more compelling view. She is right in claiming that 
a person’s values and self-concept, not merely experiential interests, can change in 
dementia—at least in dementia’s early stages when people sometimes come to appreciate 
different activities. This is the force of Jaworska’s highly intellectual grandmother,59 
whom I choose to call “Helen.” Her new appreciation for yoga, gardening, simple art-
making, and telling stories to her grandchildren not only indicates new values, but 
likely also a change of mind about what makes living worthwhile, even if she no longer 
has sufficient memory to consider her life as a whole.
 To a large extent, however, Jaworska and Dworkin talk past each other. Their 
points often depend on different accounts of critical interests, and they work with 
different paradigms of dementia. For Jaworska, anyone capable of second-order 
desires is a valuer, someone who is capable of generating new critical interests and 
changes of mind. For Dworkin, critical interests are more than just any values or 
second-order desires; they involve notions such as character, life-long convictions, 
55. Id. at 118.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 120.
58. Id. at 137.
59. See id. at 120.
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and views of “what makes life good as a whole.” Jaworska has thus not shown that 
Dworkin is mistaken about the ability of patients in dementia to have new critical 
interests in his sense. Rather, she has offered a different conception of critical interests, 
one that arguably does not address the kinds of reasons Dworkin offers for saying 
that critical interests trump experiential ones in the overall construal of best 
interests—their roots in character, conviction, and the value that people see in their 
lives as a whole.
 Though someone like Helen has new values and a new appreciation of certain 
activities, it is not clear that she has changed her mind about the value of her life in 
dementia, which is the primary evaluation she was expressing in her AED. In any 
case, even if an engaged Helen is an example of a demented person who has changed 
her mind, at some point further into progressive dementia people cannot change 
their minds in the relevant sense. As Ron Berghmans poignantly puts it, if you write 
a directive to refuse life support and request death assistance with the onset of severe 
dementia, then “at the time you would most likely ‘change your mind’” your 
experiences have become so radically different that “you don’t have enough mind left 
to change.”60 At that point, a person’s only critical interests are the ones that were 
generated previously.
 Jaworska’s claim that Margo falls into the category of someone capable of 
generating new critical interests61 is plausible only because Margo is not severely 
demented. Her critique fails to apply to someone in severe dementia, incapable of 
valuing of any kind and certainly incapable of generating new critical interests. A 
person in dementia at that stage does not reflect on her desires or deem them good 
or bad; she simply has them, like an infant or a very young child.
 She may, though, give an indication of being happy, or at least feeling content. She 
may, for example, eat with pleasure, smile occasionally, and utter sounds of apparent 
pleasure when stroked and talked to or when cuddling stuffed animals. Even with 
severe dementia, a person can be one of the happy demented. I will refer to such a 
person as “Ruth.”
 Suppose that Ruth wrote a well-informed AED to be applied in severe dementia, 
and that she reiterated it over time, as recently as in her early dementia. Dresser and 
Robertson, focusing on her present experiential interests, would say that we should not 
follow the directive. Dworkin would say we should, on the grounds of both respecting 
her autonomy and satisfying her best interests because her best interests are ultimately 
dominated by her critical interests. Jaworska does not consider this sort of case, but 
since she agrees with Dworkin that critical interests trump in determining best 
interests, it would seem she would also say that Ruth’s directive should be followed. 
However contented or happy Ruth is, even in Jaworska’s analysis, people in this stage 
no longer have the capacity for self-governance or autonomy. They cannot generate 
new critical interests. They cannot change their mind about their advance directive.
60. Ron Berghmans, Advance Directives and Dementia, 913 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 105, 107 (2000).
61. See Jaworska, supra note 52, at 135 n.54.
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 This analysis, using Dworkin and Jaworska, makes many convincing claims 
about a person in severe dementia, but, in the end, it does not provide an adequate 
analysis about whether to follow the AED expressed by someone like Ruth or Margo. 
The heart of the problem is that, in construing a demented person’s best interests, it 
is a stretch to claim that critical interests should always dominate experiential ones.
V. THE VARYING VALUE OF LIFE
 People in late-stage dementia still have worth, must be treated with dignity, and 
are entitled to respect. The notion of dignity applicable to dementia has to do with 
more than present capacities. In that respect, Dworkin’s central claim is correct: we 
respect people with dementia in part because of what they were—autonomous, self-
constituting, self-conscious selves, with narrative identities that they manifested in 
multiple ways, perhaps explicitly proclaimed, and still retain. But in late-stage 
dementia, we also respect people because of the present consciousness that remains, 
and because of their continuing roles in networks of relations. Patients with severe 
dementia are still husbands or wives, mothers or fathers, grandmothers or grandfathers. 
They are still part of the human family.
 So the question remains: How do we best demonstrate respect for them—by 
following the AED they may have or by disregarding it? Numerous complicating 
elements require multiple answers to this question. One complicating element is that 
the value of life to the demented person herself varies widely. Two factors, 
psychological continuity and narrative identity, fundamentally affect that value.
 What, in severe dementia, is the experiential value of life? Experiential interests 
remain, but there is very little—if any—anticipation or memory. Without them, 
psychological continuity within the person’s subjective life is weak. This greatly 
affects the stake that someone with dementia has in continuing to exist.62 The person 
lives in a kind of eternal present, without the ability to envisage her future existence 
or have desires about it. In that state the value of survival to the person at the time is 
greatly diminished.
 Consider Ruth. She derives enjoyment from various kinds of experiences and, in a 
certain minimal and simple sense, she wants to have these experiences. In that respect, 
she wants to go on living—since being alive is a condition of her having the experiences 
that, at the time she has them, she apparently wants. One cannot conclude from this, 
however, that she values her survival or has a stake in her continued existence, for her 
cognitive deficits prevent her from even anticipating them. Without that ability to 
anticipate, any future existence is not what matters to her. And when she survives and 
actually arrives at the future moment that she cannot anticipate, she will not see it as 
her survival if she has no memory of her earlier existence.
 In these respects, she is comparable to an infant. In contrast to an infant, however, 
Ruth’s psychological continuity with her future will continue to weaken. As it does, 
62. See Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing 503 (2002). McMahan develops a Time-Relative Interest 
Account (TRIA) of the harm of death. It is not determined solely by how much good life (in terms of 
quantity and quality) one loses, but also by the extent to which one is psychologically connected with 
one’s future.
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her stake in her own existence diminishes further. This progression is also true for 
someone like Margo, although Margo’s experiential interests—her enjoyment of a 
range of activities, her energy for living—are considerably stronger than Ruth’s. The 
conflict between Margo’s experiential interests in continuing to live and her critical 
interest in not living in dementia, as expressed in her AED, is thus sharper than this 
conflict is for Ruth.
 And Ruth’s dementia is far from the most severe that dementia can be. A person 
can be utterly passive and unresponsive, not even merely contented as is Ruth, in 
which case the person’s stake in survival is even lower. Let us call such a person 
“Walter.” To be sure, if Walter is not suffering, life may still hold some experiential 
value for him, but that value is slim. There is thus barely any conflict between his 
experiential value in living and his critical interest in dying, per his AED. To say in 
such a case that even for Walter his critical interest in dying still does not outweigh 
his extremely low experiential interest in living would imply that we were attributing 
an exceptionally low value to his critical interests. We would be treating him as a 
virtually never-competent person who had no critical interests—treatment that 
would badly disrespect him as the person he is.
 In addition to the role that psychological continuity plays in the strength of 
someone’s interest in survival, narrative identity also affects the value of life in 
dementia. Our stake in continuing to exist is largely as the individuals we conceive 
ourselves to be—that is, with narrative identity. The further a future departs from 
our conception of ourselves and the story of our lives—our character, commitments, 
and values—the weaker the stake we have in it. What makes survival into severe 
dementia to many so valueless—and to some, even horrifying—is that they will have 
lost this identity in any conscious sense and thus will no longer be themselves.
 The matter, however, is worse yet. The narrative identity people have staked out, 
in part with an AED if they have one, does not disappear when they become severely 
demented. This identity, and the critical interests it defines, continues to be attached 
to the person who now lives in severe dementia. Continuing their lives, against the 
request of their AED, snubs that identity. Because of this, the continued life here is 
not just valueless; it has negative value. Death is preferable.
 In situations like that of Lotte (the Dutch woman whose dementia involved 
unrelievable suffering), there is no positive experiential value in continuing life to 
stand in conflict with the critical interests expressed in her AED. There, the case for 
respecting the AED is strong and clear. The case for respecting it is also clear, 
however, for a person like Walter, who is in such severe dementia that he does not 
show even the minimal contentment and happiness of someone like Ruth. In his sort 
of situation, there is still some experiential interest in life, but because it is so 
minimal, it is readily outweighed by continuing critical interests. The hard cases 
occur when there is a significant conflict between experiential and critical interests, 
as with Margo and, arguably, Ruth. In those hard cases, we cannot avoid the difficult 
task of looking closely at both critical and experiential interests to discern their 
respective weights in determining the value of life and best interests.
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VI. A SLIDING SCALE
 This wide range of cases can be handled by employing a “sliding scale.” One of 
its dimensions concerns narrative identity and a person’s AED. Another dimension 
concerns the experiential value of life.
 How people end life is an important part of the meaning of their lives. Respect 
for persons includes giving them control over that end. Advance directives enable 
them to do this, and, in general, should be followed. Otherwise we treat them very 
disrespectfully, as if they were never competent.
 Not all advance directives, however, have the same moral force. Carefully 
considered advance directives based on a realistic assessment of the facts and that 
reflect a person’s enduring values have greater moral force than AEDs that do not. 
People who wish to avoid severe dementia through an advance directive need to be 
informed about dementia’s various stages and what life may be like in them. They 
should be aware that it is likely impossible to know whether the later person with 
dementia will be one of the happy demented, or one of the frightened, anxious, or 
distressingly confused. Furthermore, moral weight is added to a directive if it is 
reiterated in the relatively early stages of dementia when a person can still understand 
it. All of this places a burden on people who want to make advance directives for 
PAD, but not an unreasonable burden given the gravity of what they are asking 
others to do at a later time.
 Carefully considered AEDs should also not be the result of mere prejudice or an 
unthinking assumption that life in dementia is unmitigated horror, nor should they 
express other kinds of blatantly unreasonable preferences. To Ludwig Minelli, 
founder of the Swiss organization Dignitas, which caters to foreigners coming to 
Switzerland for aid in dying, it does not matter why the person wants to die; the only 
value is self-determination.63 But it does matter. As Rhoden put it, “When they start 
saying, ‘If I can’t do higher mathematics, kill me,’ we will have to worry in earnest 
about the limits of precedent autonomy.”64
 Even when an AED is written with adequate knowledge of, and without prejudice 
against, dementia, however, the substantive question of employing it to avoid living 
in dementia may not lend itself to a simple yes-or-no answer. One complicating 
factor is the possibility that the writer of the AED, who preferred death to living in 
dementia, might change her mind. Helen is arguably such a person.65 Jaworska sees 
Margo as a person who also has changed her mind.
 Indeed, Margo generally enjoys her current life, but it does not follow that she 
has necessarily changed her mind about the value of her life in dementia. From her 
engagement in various activities and enjoyment of them, one might infer that her life 
63. See Amelia Gentleman, Inside the Dignitas House, Guardian (London) (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/society/2009/nov/18/assisted-suicide-dignitas-house.
64. Rhoden, supra note 40, at 860.
65. Unlike Mrs. D., who is based on an actual person, Helen is a fictitious example. How realistic is Helen? 
It should be pointed out that at one presentation of parts of this article, an experienced physician in the 
audience said that he had never met a demented person like Helen.
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now has value to her—a value she did not anticipate when she wrote her AED. On 
this interpretation, Margo has changed her mind, and it is plainly wrong to hold her 
to her prior values. One could also argue, however, that while Margo retains capacity 
for enjoyment, she no longer has the cognitive capacity to consider or reflect on what 
makes her life as a whole worth living, and therefore she is not capable of revising or 
rejecting her previous values in the sort of robust form necessary to generate an 
AED. In the last analysis, between these two conflicting perceptions, it may simply 
be unclear whether Margo has changed her mind about the value of her life.
 Suppose, amidst this ambiguity about change of mind, that one decided that 
Margo’s clear AED should be regarded as indicative of her reflective preferences and 
relevant critical interests. To respect her autonomy, we should then implement her 
AED. But autonomy is not the only consideration. Margo also has experiential interests 
in continued life. The happier and more engaged she is, the stronger are her experiential 
interests in living, and the harder it is to justify ending her life—even if her AED is 
informed and clear, and she has not changed her mind in the relevant sense.
 Hesitancy springs from more than just her experiential happiness. Would 
acceding to her directive be socially tolerable? Aid in dying implicates many more 
people than just the recipient. It involves the individual physician who participates, 
and the medical community as a whole insofar as it provides guidelines and 
safeguards. Also involved, as part of the web of relationships of the person with 
dementia, are friends, family members, and other caregivers. The decision to allow 
people to receive aid in dying is a social one and, to put the point starkly, do we really 
want to be the sort of society where some people who are living happy lives, lives 
they now apparently enjoy and want to continue, are put to death?
 Even Dworkin acknowledges that there might be valid reasons for refusing to 
follow the directive of a happily demented person.66 He only insists that if such 
refusal is justifiable, “we cannot claim to be acting for her [Margo’s] sake,”67 for he 
thinks that when we consider the critical interests of the happily demented, carrying 
out their directives is still in their overall best interests.
 Carrying out Margo’s AED would indeed respect her autonomy, but it is 
doubtful, at least, that it would be in her best interests. For Dworkin, the matter is 
simple: critical interests invariably trump experiential ones.68 But what is the 
argument for thinking that invariably they trump?69 Even if we acknowledge that 
autonomy favors implementing the directive, it strains credibility to insist that the 
happily demented person who still has some zest for life would be better off dead.
 The clearest case of the opposite sort, when the argument for following a person’s 
AED is strongest, is when the individual experiences severe and irremediable suffering, 
66. Dworkin makes this point in his response to Seana Shiffrin. Dworkin and His Critics: With 
Replies by Dworkin 370 (Justine Burley ed., 2004).
67. Dworkin, supra note 15, at 232.
68. See id. at 231. 
69. Similar reservations about the dominance of critical interests are expressed by L.W. Sumner. Sumner, 
supra note 30, at 115–16.
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as Lotte apparently did. It is clearly in Lotte’s interest that her directive be carried out. 
That does not mean, however, that the Dutch position is right in making unbearable 
suffering a necessary condition for voluntary euthanasia. I reject the Dutch view that 
voluntary euthanasia is permissible only in the presence of unbearable suffering.
 A definitive case for this claim is Walter. He is more passive than Ruth, neither 
happy nor miserable, and no longer capable of changing his mind about his AED. 
When autonomous and reflective on his life as a whole, he found death preferable to 
the prospect of living in complete dependence, without any compensating pleasures, 
unable to recognize—much less converse with—family and loved ones, and using up 
all the final resources he badly wanted to leave for particular persons and causes. 
Suppose that Walter reiterated that choice in the last part of his life, including the 
stage when he was mildly demented. Then, both out of respect for his autonomy and 
in recognition that his stake in continuing to live is vanishingly small, his directive 
should be followed. We should not have to show that he is experiencing “unbearable 
suffering” to carry out his AED. The justification for following it is the combination 
of two facts: that he has clearly, knowledgeably, and persistently said that he did not 
want to end his life in years of severe dementia, and that his current experiential 
interest in living is so weak.
 It is possible to summarize these various considerations into a sliding scale that 
incorporates both autonomy and the current capacity for enjoyment.70 An advance 
directive for PAD, written by an informed and competent person, gains in authority 
as the capacities of a person to generate new critical interests and to enjoy life 
decrease. It has less authority, by contrast, when the person retains the ability to 
value and generate new critical interests and still gives indication of enjoying her life. 
Helen, and perhaps Margo, exemplify the latter, Walter and Ruth the former.
 To be sure, for Ruth the application of the sliding scale is difficult, but it still 
leans toward implementing her directive. Yes, Ruth is somewhat happy, but not as 
happy as Margo; still less does she have any of the zest for life exemplified by 
someone like Helen. Whether Ruth’s AED should be followed depends on the 
strength of the relevant critical and experiential interests. If Ruth had very strong 
views about not living in dementia—like Lotte did, for example—her AED should 
be followed. Her critical interest in not living in severe dementia is clear and strong, 
she no longer has the capacity to change it, and her experiential interest in life is 
relatively weak.
 The determining factor is not, as it would be under Dworkin and Jaworska’s 
analysis, that Ruth’s critical interests define her best interests; it is that her experiential 
interest in continued life is weak and her critical interests are clear and strong. The 
larger moral picture now comes into view. If we maintained that the experiential value 
of Ruth’s survival, as weak as it is, still outweighed the autonomy and deep convictions 
70. The notion of a sliding scale is borrowed from Allen Buchanan and Dan W. Brock. See Allen Buchanan 
& Dan W. Brock, Deciding for Others: Competency, 64 Milbank Q. 17, 67–80 (1986). Some of the same 
factors included in the sliding scale here are used by Leslie P. Francis. See Leslie P. Francis, 
Decisionmaking at the End of Life: Patients with Alzheimer’s or Other Dementia, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 539, 588–
92 (2001).
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that comprise a significant part of her narrative identity, we would be saying, in effect, 
that such autonomy and conviction counted for very little indeed. We would be 
treating the now incompetent but previously competent person as if she had never 
been competent, a great affront to autonomous persons and their narrative identity.
VII. PROGRESSIVE DEMENTIA AS A KIND OF TERMINAL ILLNESS
 Thus, neither unbearable suffering nor contemporary competence holds up as a 
necessary moral requirement for justified assisted death. The extremely important 
requirement of voluntariness that is the rationale for contemporary competence can 
be met by a sufficiently clear, informed, and persistent AED that a person did not 
change when she still had the capacity to do so. So, too, the rationale behind a 
requirement of unbearable suffering can be met in other ways. Its underlying rationale 
is that with such unmitigated suffering, the balance of value left in life has turned 
negative, and therefore, life is worse than death. But that rationale can also be met 
when severe dementia greatly diminishes the stake that a person continues to have in 
her own survival. There, too, in the face of the strong critical interests reflected in a 
person’s clear, knowledgeable, and persistent AED, the value that is now left in life 
has, on balance, turned negative.
 Terminal illness, the rationale for the third of the legal eligibility conditions used 
to prevent abuse, can also gain traction in dementia. Dementia itself is seldom labeled 
a terminal illness, but in severe dementia of the typical progressive sort, degeneration 
occurs “gradually and inexorably, usually leading to death in a severely debilitated, 
immobile state between four and twelve years after onset.”71 The relevant element is 
not merely the inevitability of the years-long march toward death, but the kind of 
debilitation involved along the way. In most chronic, progressive disease situations 
other than dementia, there is good reason for not seeing as “terminally ill” someone 
who is probably still years away from death. First, line-drawing issues present 
themselves—would we then categorize advanced old age itself, for example, as 
“terminal illness,” for the march toward death is inevitable there, too? Second, too 
much life will often still be left to live to put all that remains under the color of 
impending death; death may indeed be coming, down the road, but the road has 
many segments yet to travel before getting there. A third consideration is that any 
prognosis of death within a certain number of months becomes less certain the larger 
that the requisite number of months becomes.
 Progressive dementia that is already severe is different on all three of these scores. 
It is utterly different than non-demented old age itself: much less valuable life is left 
in the years of severe dementia than in the years of non-demented old age. And the 
prognosis of eventual death from the advance of the dementia itself is at least as 
secure as a prognosis of death within six months in most fatal illnesses.
 Overlying all of these considerations is the central fact of the degree of mental 
debilitation in severe dementia. That has already brought to an end—or very near to 
71. Dworkin, supra note 15, at 219 (quoting Dennis J. Selkoe, Amyloid Protein and Alzheimer’s Disease, 265 
Sci. Am. 68, 68 (1991)).
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the end—the life that the person regards as valuable and that the person is gratified 
to have had. In severe dementia, the self has literally withered. From a personal 
perspective, therefore, severe dementia already constitutes real dying. The point is 
bolstered by reflecting on the comparison between an illness in which our prognosis 
is that we are within six months of death, and the years-long chronic illness of severe 
dementia. To me, anyone who writes a clear and persistent AED for dementia is 
likely to see severe dementia as equally, if not more so, their “last stage” years when 
life is nearly over as they are likely to see any last six months when diagnosed with a 
more typical terminal illness. In the terms that matter to people, the rationale for 
limiting PAD to terminal illness applies just as much to multiple years of severe 
progressive dementia as it does to life predicted to end within six months.
VIII.  THE ROAD FROM CURRENT LEGALIZATION TO ADVANCE EUTHANASIA 
DIRECTIVES
 Morally, the previous argument can be summarized in four points. First, there is 
a strong prima facie case for following advance directives in dementia, both for the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and for aid in dying. Advance directives 
enable people to have some measure of control over the way they die, and the way 
they die is an important reflection of how they have lived. This cannot be said better 
than Nancy Rhoden has: 
Something is wrong . . . when we treat formerly competent patients as if they 
were never competent. Someone who makes a prior directive sees herself as 
the unified subject of a human life. She sees her concern for her body, her 
goals, or her family as transcending her incapacity . . . . [O]ne . . . component 
of treating persons with respect [is] that we view them as they view themselves. 
If we are to do this, we must not ignore their prior choices and values.72
 At the same time, countervailing factors must be considered. These can be 
summarized in the remaining points.
 Second, the clearer and more informed and persistent an advance directive, the 
more moral authority it has. Writers of AEDs need to be aware of the varying stages 
and affective dimensions of dementia, and they should assess and reiterate them well 
into beginning dementia.
 Third, the case for following an AED is strongest in the presence of severe and 
irremediable suffering. This is exemplified by the case of Lotte, the woman in 
advanced dementia who received euthanasia in the Netherlands in March 2011.
 Fourth, for other cases, a sliding scale that considers both autonomy and the 
capacity for enjoyment provides the justification for determining when an AED 
should be followed. As the demented person’s capacity to generate new critical 
interests and to enjoy life decreases, a clear, informed, and persistent AED gains in 
authority for implementation.
 Applying this sliding scale generates conclusions to all the cases; Mrs. D. and 
Helen, on the moderate or mild end of dementia’s spectrum, are two of the easiest. 
72. Rhoden, supra note 40, at 860.
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The compelling conclusion about implementing their AEDs is “not yet.” Significant 
dementia has diminished their capacity to change their minds and their critical 
interests, but Helen, especially, has adapted to her dementia with new interests and 
real zest for life. Both enjoy and value the lives they are living. Their strong 
experiential interests in living outweigh any critical interest they have, from their 
AEDs, in not living in dementia. As of this point in time, dementia has turned out not 
to be as dreadful as they feared.
 Another relatively easy case is at the opposite end of the spectrum: Walter, who 
is very severely demented and without the minimal contentment and happiness of 
Ruth. If his AED is informed, clear, and persistent, it should be implemented. He 
now has no capacity to generate new critical interests, and he takes little—if any—
enjoyment in life.
 Ruth’s directive, too, should be implemented, though her case is more complex 
because she is largely content and somewhat happy. As such, she has some experiential 
interest in continued survival, but because she has no capacity to generate any new 
critical interests, and because the value of her life to herself is greatly diminished by 
her inability either to remember or to anticipate, any clear and persistent AED she 
has should be implemented.
 The hardest case is Margo. She can likely still value particular experiences, and 
many she now has she certainly enjoys. It is not clear, however, whether she can 
observe or reflect on life enough to value it, and she appears not to have the capacity 
to reflect on her life as a whole. If she has a strong and reiterated AED stated to 
include the moderately severe level of her current dementia, she exemplifies a sharp 
clash between autonomy and critical interests, on the one hand, and current 
experiential interests on the other. Margo has enough capacity for memory and 
anticipation to generate real enjoyment of life. In light of that enjoyment, on balance, 
society should firmly say for her, “Not yet.”
 The road from legalized aid in dying and euthanasia to legally actionable AEDs 
for severe dementia thus has a sound moral basis. By their very own rationales, none 
of the three eligibility conditions currently in place for legally permissible PAD is 
strictly required. Contemporary competence is not the only context in which the 
crucial moral demand for voluntariness can be satisfied; a clear, well-informed, 
persistent advance directive also satisfies it. The requirement of terminal illness in 
the sense that people are with reasonable certainty near the end of their lives is met 
just as clearly by end-stage progressive dementia as it is by other illnesses with 
prognosis of death within six months. The rationale that there is no positive balance 
of value left in life is satisfied not only by unbearable suffering, but when the 
experiential value of survival is so minimal that it is outweighed by the strong critical 
interests reflected in a clear and persistent AED.
 In conclusion, two observations can be added about the larger legal context for 
AEDs. First, the emergence of AEDs as morally acceptable can have more than one 
logical legal home. One is the Netherlands, where euthanasia is legal (evidenced by 
the real case of Lotte). There, voluntariness, not just unbearable suffering, is a 
required condition for permissible euthanasia, and a strong and reiterated AED can 
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be interpreted as making euthanasia voluntary. An equally logical home for AEDs, 
however, is the legalized aid in dying of Vermont, Oregon, Washington, British 
Columbia, and Switzerland. There, too, the emphasis on voluntariness can be 
plausibly extended to include AEDs. Those jurisdictions’ laws, of course, would have 
to be rewritten (or their court decisions extended), but the current requirements of 
terminal prognosis within six months and current competency73 are at odds with aid 
in dying’s fundamental emphasis on voluntariness. The underlying legal and moral 
framework of these jurisdictions, too, can incorporate carefully implemented AEDs.
 Second, most of this analysis of implementing advance directives for dementia 
applies as much to the refusal of life-supporting treatment as it does to PAD. The 
same dilemmas arise about interpreting change of mind and weighing critical and 
experiential interests. All of the types of persons with dementia analyzed regarding 
implementation of an AED can also have a more traditional directive for refusal of 
life support. Presumably, those whose aim in having an AED is to not live long in 
severe dementia would want to include in their directive not just PAD—but also the 
withholding and withdrawal of feeding tubes, for example, and the refusal of most 
hospitalization from nursing homes. Such “regular” directives for refusing life-
supportive treatment in dementia are legally actionable and pair logically with AEDs, 
yet AEDs are not now legally permitted. The precedent of these already actionable 
advance directives has great practical importance. A high percentage of patients with 
advanced dementia in nursing homes develop infectious episodes and eating 
problems, and many are hospitalized for acute crises multiple times a year.74 In so far 
as advance directives to refuse life support are already being implemented for patients 
like Ruth and Walter, and to the extent that we are confident about the appropriate 
contexts in which their implementation is justified, they provide important precedent 
for the eventual acceptance of AEDs.
73. In Switzerland, only current competency is required. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
74. In a study of 323 nursing home residents with advanced dementia, 45% lived longer than eighteen 
months, 86% developed an eating problem, and the average number of transfers to a hospital in the last 
ninety days of life was 1.6 transfers. See Mitchell et al., supra note 25, at 45–46; Susan L. Mitchell et al., 
The Clinical Course of Advanced Dementia, 361 New Eng. J. Med. 1529, 1529–38 (2009).
